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Abstract
Classic theories of deterrence do not envisage the concepts of 
resilience and deterrence as even remotely connected. However, 
these two notions may not be poles apart and may, in fact, offer 
complementary perspectives in envisioning options for dealing 
with the security challenges of the twenty-first century. This 
chapter explores the correspondence between the two concepts. 
Firstly, it discusses definitions and key tenets of these concepts in 
relation to security. Then, it goes on to review what differentiates 
and what links these concepts in terms of the risk approach each 
presents; this includes an examination of rationality in deterrence 
and resilience frameworks as well as looking at the growing 
acknowledgement that their evolution is influenced by systems 
thinking. The chapter then considers in what way deterrence
theory and the emerging resilience theory display areas of 
complementary and mismatch. This is achieved by examining how, 
on the one hand, both approaches may be able to support one 
another and, on the other hand, how the significance of change and 
transformation in both frameworks can provide pointers to where 
future thinking might lead. 
Classic theories of deterrence do not envisage the concepts of 
resilience and deterrence as even remotely connected. However, 
these two notions may not be poles apart and may, in fact, offer 
complementary perspectives in envisioning options for dealing 
with the security challenges of the twenty-first century. This 
chapter explores the correspondence between the two concepts. 
Firstly, it discusses definitions and key tenets of these concepts in 
relation to security. Then, it goes on to review what differentiates 
and what links these concepts in terms of the risk approach each 
presents; this includes an examination of rationality in deterrence 
and resilience frameworks as well as looking at the growing 
acknowledgement that their evolution is influenced by systems 
thinking. The chapter then considers in what way deterrence 
theory and the emerging resilience theory display areas of 
complementary and mismatch. This is achieved by examining how, 
on the one hand, both approaches may be able to support one 
another and, on the other hand, how the significance of change and 
transformation in both frameworks can provide pointers to where 
future thinking might lead. 
1.
Deterrence and Resilience Are Contrasting 
Cornerstones of Security 
Deterrence is not new, nor did it start in the Cold War when the 
balance of power characterising the era was based on the notion 
central to this concept: that punishment or threats discourages 
wrongdoers (Bendiek and Metzger 2015). States have long used 
deterrence amongst other standard practices such as diplomacy or 
espionage to shape their relations. The turn of the twentieth century 
sees growing interest and efforts to qualify the use and value of 
deterrence as an instrument for security policy. Studies and 
considerations have multiplied in an effort to clarify what the 
Chinese strategist Sun Tzu described as “the successful practice of 
deterrence […] the highpoint of skill – superior even to winning 
military victories” (Payne 2010; p. 217). Research into the topic 
became widespread during the Cold War era when investigations 
broadened to issues of “motives and perspectives that incite 
preparations to use attacks and war in conflicts; things that make 
deterrence work or fail; how best to apply it, and what to avoid; 
the circumstances in which it is most properly used or not; and 
how to reduce chances of deterrence failures” (Morgan 2012; p. 
87). Still today – and perhaps even more so in the post-Cold War 
and 9/11 world of asymmetric threats – the search for the place of 
deterrence in the twenty-first century security environment still 
attracts academic attention. 
Defence doctrine, often where deterrence has gained prominence, 
explains the military instrument of power and its utility and locates 
it against government’s means to secure policy ends. Deterrence 
and coercion are both strategies by which a nation can respectively 
dissuade or encourage another’s course of action. However, the 
pursuit of strategic goals involving Defence or the ‘military 
instrument’ will ultimately fit in a broader political setting (UK 
Chief of the Defence Staff 2014). Time and again, the absence of 
wars between great powers has been upheld as the confirmation of 
the success of deterrence strategies, noting that “deterrence did not 
just prevent wars but was achieved via war” (Morgan 2012; p. 86).
According to Morgan (2012) deterrence represented such an 
underpinning to national security management that approaches to 
its strategic (relating to nuclear threats) and non-strategic (relating 
to more conventional threats) implementation attracted more 
attention and resources than many other instruments in 
international politics. The reality of the post-Cold War era has seen 
a redefinition of international security management by a coalition 
of Western powers being sought. Deterrent instruments in the 
hands of these powers prove to be of little value in an age of terror 
groups and unconventional conflicts. Interestingly, advice once 
given by military experts is increasingly provided by security 
specialists. 
Nevertheless, the United States still appears to be committed to the 
idea that deterrence should remain the cornerstone of global and 
regional security – notwithstanding their willingness to spread the 
burden of leading the provision of such core deterrence 
capabilities. This is all the more noticeable in the light of recent 
news headlines, such as Russian interventions in Crimea and 
Ukraine or the development of the DPRK (Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea) missile technology and strike capabilities. For 
the US, the danger is not so much one of a “nuclear attack against 
the U.S. homeland but from the possibility that nuclear-armed 
adversaries will use the threat of escalation to the nuclear level to 
act more aggressively in their regions and prevent the United 
States from coming to the defense of its allies and partners” 
(Einhorn and Pifer 2017; p. iv). 
Turning to resilience, its documented Latin roots (‘resilire’ 
meaning ‘spring’ or ‘bounce back’) give the concept a sense of 
being established – yet it is very much seen as a current political 
catchword and still evolving as a concept in the security domain. 
To better grasp the concept Giroux and Prior (2012) identify five 
key dimensions, reflecting the various disciplines of the study of 
resilience. For them, there are five fundamental areas of resilience 
and, together, they encapsulate the relationships and dynamics of 
modern society: 
The “engineering/physical [dimension] refers to physical 
infrastructure and systems while the psychological dimension 
refers to the social domain that focuses on the individual. We then 
turn to perceptions of ‘bouncing back’ within 
the business/economic world – drawing from debates on business 
continuity management and business leadership/management. […]. 
This relates to the overall operations of businesses and the role of 
management. The final two sub-sections on ecological […] looks at 
how research on ecological systems has found that bouncing back 
from shocks can be both static (strict ecological process) or 
dynamic (in socio-ecological systems) and the expression of 
resilience is dependent largely on the scale of enquiry (predator-
prey interaction versus human interaction in natural ecosystems). 
Similarly, […] research on community resilience reveals the 
importance of adaptive learning and transformation.” (Giroux and 
Prior 2012; p. 6) 
On the whole, from a social science outlook and away from its 
origins in the natural sciences, the most commonly found 
definitions refer to the characteristics of societies to deal with 
disruptions – normally global threats such as economic crisis, 
climate change and international terrorism (Haimes 2009). 
Focusing on the UK as an example, the concept of resilience 
evolved predominantly in the public policy sphere of civil 
contingencies (under the auspices of the Cabinet Office). For the 
UK government, in 2004, the idea for building resilience was “to 
reduce the risk from emergencies so that people can go about their 
business freely and with confidence” (Cabinet Office 2011a). The 
government’s activities focused on assisting civil protection 
practitioners to support the work that goes on across the United 
Kingdom to improve emergency planning and preparedness 
(Cabinet Office 2013). It is worthy of note that the events of 9/11 
greatly influenced resilience thinking by introducing “a form and 
severity of terrorism not previously encountered in the UK – a 
dimension where the terrorist has no concern for their own life and 
is intent on causing as many fatalities as possible” (O’Brien and 
Read 2005; p. 354). The consequence of this is that international 
terrorism has become an obvious priority for resilience strategies, 
not just in the UK, but throughout the Western world. 
Although a recent addition, resilience features prominently at the 
heart of contemporary national security. Resilience is thought of as 
an antidote to new risks and threats from diverse origins – from 
natural disasters to cyber-attacks – and is thus a critical component 
of national security strategies in Western powers. Resilience is 
envisaged as a capability in the hands of public authorities, but also 
more broadly in society because the protection of critical 
infrastructure is largely dependent on the private sector – 
companies that operates and often own such infrastructure 
(Omand 2008). The broadening of resilience beyond the idea of 
just ‘securing the functioning of the state’ is noted by Joseph in his 
comparison of UK and French implementation of the concept and 
who remarks “Resilience is said to have a social dimension, 
located not only in the state but also among the actors of civil 
society. Resilience is both an objective of the state and a state of 
society.” (Joseph 2013; p. 257). Such an understanding of 
resilience, one promoting a new relation between government and 
society based on a more proactive culture towards security issues, 
is, according to Joseph (2013), a contentiously neoliberal concept 
that has to do with governing populations and assigning 
responsibilities to different actors. 
In examining the definitions and understandings of both deterrence 
and resilience, it is noticeable that both concepts are key 
components of modern national security. Perhaps the former is 
more attached to external manifestations of security, whilst the 
latter is fundamentally focussed on internal national mechanisms. 
By embracing approaches that involve a broad set of stakeholders 
and actors (which goes beyond what has hitherto been the sole 
domain of State actors), resilience provides new thinking and new 
instruments for managing uncertainty and security challenges. In 
many ways, resilience can be understood as a pragmatic way to 
tackle globalised threats to national security. 
2.
Deterrence and Resilience as Risk 
Approaches 
Albeit in differing ways, deterrence and resilience theories have 
risk at their core. The fundamental processes at the heart of UK 
resilience1 relate to on-going risk identification and analysis that is 
essential to the anticipation and management of disruptive events. 
In practical terms, these processes allow the UK government to 
define its capabilities programme through which the government 
seeks to build resilience across all parts of the UK. To all intents 
and purposes, the 2008 National Security Strategy explains the 
Government’s approach to resilience entailing in a risk 
management process set out in the 2004 Civil Contingencies Act. 
The Act lays out “responsibilities of frontline responders to assess 
local risks and publish them in community risk registers; to 
prepare plans; to make arrangements to warn and inform the 
public in the event of emergencies; and to promote business 
continuity” (Cabinet Office 2008; p. 41). Resilience has, since 
2004, grown beyond the domain of emergency response and it is 
now the responsibility of risk managers in organisations of all types 
and sizes, public and private, to plan and prepare their outfits or 
systems to return to a normal functioning state quickly after a 
disturbance. To a great extent, resilience is approached in a holistic
manner involving stakeholders from all parts of society – be they 
governance structures, civil society, communities and individuals –
to play their role in the mitigation and response to current and 
future threats. The novelty in the approach to risk relies on the 
expertise and judgement of practitioners who perform risk 
assessments and then prioritise those risks and publish their written 
justification to allow public scrutiny. The communications relating 
to risks taking place between authorities and the public at local 
level has, therefore, become a condition of building resilience 
(O’Brien and Read 2005). 
Equally, traditional deterrence strategy relies on leaders 
considering rationally the risks and costs of war (Fearon 1995). The 
frequently cited definition (found in US doctrine) sees deterrence 
as the “prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of 
unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action 
outweighs the perceived benefits.” (U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff 2016). Essentially, the mechanism relies on calculations of 
what gains and consequences follow a certain course of action. 
Thus, a fundamental assumption underpinning this framework is 
that actors involved act rationally and will weigh up their options 
so as to optimise their outcomes (Achen and Snidal 1989). Here the 
risk approach consists of calculating how much is enough to deter 
our adversaries from action against us and to fulfil our security 
needs. At the height of the Cold War the calculations led the US to 
determine the adequate2 nuclear capability to “assure destruction” 
of the Soviet threat (Payne 2010; pp. 217–218). Here, an interesting 
difference can be noted, in that deterrence is an instrument 
predominantly framed from the perspective of the role of the state. 
Admittedly, non-state actors are increasingly the subject of interest 
of new forms of deterrence as it is thought that they too can be 
subject of political ‘influence’ if not deterrence in the customary 
sense (Brimmer 2008). Here the issue of “un-deterrability” of some 
adversaries is paramount. Much research has been geared to 
understand this phenomenon and some link it to issues of 
communication (Rhodes 2000). Hence, in a comparable way to 
resilience, the achievement of deterrence relies in part on credible 
calculations supported by effective communications. 
2.1.
Rationality in Deterrence and Resilience 
Frameworks 
The importance of perception in people’s sense and judgement of 
dangerous situations has been the focus of much research in the 
past 40 years. Stein (2009) refers to this trend as the ‘cognitive 
revolution’. Seminal papers have pointed to limits to rationality and 
the existence of heuristics used when thinking and making 
decisions under uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; 
Slovic 1987). This area of research has shown how much richer 
than expected by experts is the conceptualization of risk by lay 
people. Calculations reflect sophisticated and compounded 
concerns on the voluntariness, dread, knowledge, controllability of 
the risk. In addition, biases introduce errors in decision making and 
affect the assessment of probability or impact of events. 
Ultimately, they lead to judgments based on information of limited 
validity. 
The rationality of states waging war (or preparing to do so) has 
been long discussed and rationalist arguments appear deficient. 
War is costly and risky, so, why do rational states fail to favour 
negotiated settlements (Fearon 1995). Understanding some of the 
flaws of rationality leading to conflicts will provide some insights 
as to why deterrence fails. A number of studies point to the 
paradoxical irrationality described as “the propensity of leaders to 
go to war in conditions where they are likely to lose” (Lebow 2007; 
p. 12). Lebow further argues that in the 30 wars fought since 1945 
less than a third had achieved their war aims and as was the case 
the Vietnam War “the United States won every battle but still lost 
the war.” Lebow’s interpretation is that imperfect or incomplete 
information is not always the root cause of deficient decision-
making processes. All too often leaders focus on their own political 
goals and subsequently offer justification to their opponent’s 
tactics: “once committed to challenges, they engaged in bolstering 
and other forms of post-decisional rationalization, and became 
even more insensitive to information and warnings that suggested 
their challenge was likely to end in disaster.” (Lebow 2007; p. 8). 
Fearon (1995) also expressed similar views on miscalculations 
about relative power that only war can resolve. Such 
miscalculations reflect the existence of incentives to misrepresent, 
the belief of an opponent’s (un)willingness to fight or a broken-
down commitment to peace negotiations. For Rhodes (2000), 
rational calculations are imperfect not only in the assessment of 
risks of a course of action but also in the estimation one has of the 
control the risks of any option. That is to say that the “desire to 
control risks and avoid policies that threaten open-ended 
commitments and costs has important implications for the kinds of 
military options that risk-averse potential aggressors find 
attractive or unattractive.” (Rhodes 2000; p. 244). Defence 
doctrine encapsulates the limits to rationality in a short warning to 
its military commanders: “Deterrence and coercion strategies will 
be contested and commanders must understand the weight of effort 
an opponent will apply to achieve their aims.” (UK Chief of the 
Defence Staff 2014). Opponents’ interests, their perception of the 
balance of power, awareness of bargaining space and alternative 
outcomes available to them, as well as their sense of gains and 
losses are all part and parcel of calculations. Stein (2009) points 
out that at the heart of rational decision making lies a careful 
examination of evidence and a thorough information screening and 
management process. However, she notes that neuroscience and 
psychology studies tend to converge in showing the difficulty 
decision makers have in practice to be logical and to weigh the 
evidence (without biases and intuitive processes often used to 
interpret evidence3) in a coherent and consistent manner. 
As seen earlier, risk management can be envisioned as an entry 
point in the implementation of resilience (Mitchell and 
Harris 2012). It is argued that the very essence of managing risks 
presents weaknesses. Jaeger (2010) suggests that applying general 
principles and formulas in defining preventative actions to guard 
against particular risk contexts is laden with difficulties. Mitigation 
measures are the result of the computation of hypothetical scenario 
and complex calculations combining probability and utility. 
Defining rational decisions in the context of disaster management 
and resilience policies, argues Jaeger, will require more research. 
Another significant matter is that the illusion of rationality when 
dealing with risks deceives societies. This view is one put forward 
by Adams (1999) who refers to risks, particularly those that are not 
intuitive or directly perceptible (such as climbing a tree), being left 
to the judgement of “experts” whose analyses are informed by 
scientific information. The authority of scientific and rational 
expert views has led risk management to be concerned 
predominantly with the conversion of all risks into numerical forms 
disregarding the notions of rewards. This institutionalisation 
phenomenon of risk management is far reaching and has profound 
effects, which Adams summarises in writing: “Institutions – 
government departments or large commercial enterprises – usually 
assign the job of risk management to particular people or 
departments who have no (or very little) balancing responsibility 
and rarely consider rewards to be gained from particular actions.” 
(Adams 1999; p. 12). This view builds on the idea of social 
construction put forward by Douglas and Wildavski (1982). 
The fundamental question behind the issue of social selection is 
one that focuses on who would carry out such selection and 
prioritisation of risks and why. According to this argument, the 
mobilisation around certain risks allows certain directions and 
public concerns be prioritised – thus risk acceptability is a political 
issue (also referred to as a construction of risks). Similarly, Furedi 
(2002) denounces a culture of fear, arguing that greater security 
and safety in modern societies has developed through innovation 
and experimentation rather than via risk avoidance and obsessive 
quantification. 
Amongst the numerous works on biases and influences on risk 
perception, Slovic (1987) describes how the perception and 
acceptance of risk is influenced by social and cultural factors such 
as friends, family and other respected public or private individuals. 
Slovic’s research on risk from a psychological perspective exposes 
that mental strategies – heuristics – often developed in order to deal 
with uncertainty and assist in decision-making are, in fact, 
persistent biases in the perception of risks. This has fundamental 
consequences on the public management of risk through the 
forecasting of acceptance and oppositions. Whilst additional 
information about hazards will influence public assessments, it is 
also important to take into account heuristics such as: risk and 
benefit tend to be positively correlated4 (Slovic and Peters 2006). 
Consequently, this calls for the inclusion of risk communication 
about prevention and treatment of risk as integral part of risk 
management. 
2.2.
Deterrence and Resilience Frameworks and Systems 
Thinking 
Systems thinking has permeated in the resilience domain. The 
frameworks attached to systems theory relate to the examination of 
processes, linkages and interactions between the parts (or 
components) of a system. Defining the system also requires 
delineating its boundaries and, thereafter, allows the investigation 
of relations with its environment (open systems that have 
recognised links with their environment are thought to be more 
common and realistic). 
Although this had long been the case in the ecological tradition, the 
exploration of systemic processes and complex interactions that 
generate resilience is a more recent trend in social science; the 
broadening of perspectives led to looking at resilience in terms of 
change and adaptation. This emanated from the ecological and 
social ecological traditions (Walker and Salt 2012; Folke 2006) 
where “resilience is the capacity of a system, be it an individual, a 
forest, a city or an economy, to deal with change and continue to 
develop. It is about how humans and nature can use shocks and 
disturbances like a financial crisis or climate change to spur 
renewal and innovative thinking”. (Stockholm Resilience 
Centre 2017). Giroux and Prior note the importance of this outlook: 
“From this perspective, resilience is an adaptive process 
characterised by systemic re-organisation, renewal and 
development – where equilibrium or a steady-state response is 
neither anticipated nor desired” (2012; p. 10). 
For Joseph (2013) the growing literature on the adaptation of social 
systems presents challenges. It encourages citizens to take active 
role and responsibility in ensuring the needed changes take place in 
order to meet face and absorb shocks. For him, the concept of 
resilience shows its liberal side through its fundamental acceptance 
of a situation and its leaning on individuals and not only on 
institutions to maintain an ‘acceptable’ level of function. 
Nevertheless, the notion of the ‘dynamics of systems’ fits with a 
growing consensus that today’s societal challenges are globalised 
and are exacerbated by complex interconnections. Unsurprisingly, 
the study and further implementation of resilience goes beyond 
mere crisis management, it entails the grasp of the system’s 
internal complexity and of the interconnection the system has with 
its environment. Giroux and Prior encapsulate the intricacy of 
building systemic resilience: “It likely calls for a multi-layered 
approach to resilience development (or maintenance) since it is 
concerned not only with ensuring infrastructures are resilient, but 
that these are operated and used by resilient communities, who in 
turn are buoyed and serviced by resilient businesses and 
economies.” (2012; p. 14). 
The broadening of resilience strategies beyond emergency 
management is noticeable in the UK. The government recognises 
that resilience in society concerns infrastructure, communities and 
businesses; thus, the delineation of the system boundaries now 
includes entities such as buildings, systems and networks (Cabinet 
Office 2014). It is also visible in the realm of security. Prior (2017) 
explains that new security challenges for NATO members are to be 
considered in the light of ‘hyper-connectivity’ and 
interdependence. It is, therefore, vital that NATO is coherent in its 
drive for increased resilience and that “it recognizes the need for 
distributed responses across the large number of actors 
responsible for managing and protecting critical infrastructures: a 
space where threats are not dealt with by solely relying on a 
military monopoly.” (Prior 2017; p. 2). Hence, the effect of system 
thinking and broader approaches is a shift in emphasis away from 
purely military solutions to security. Equally, the broadening of 
perspective induces a change in security management approaches 
based on prevention and acknowledging the limited power of 
centralised structures. The latest resilience approaches attempt to 
be less specific (than traditional risk management would normally 
prescribe) and more generic by acknowledging “the existence and 
persistence of existing risks (anticipating) and the necessity of 
understanding systemic vulnerability in order to prepare for 
potential future shocks and disturbances (adapting)” (Prior 2017; 
p. 3).
As noted earlier, deterrence theory evolved through waves of 
questioning and conceptual development. Knopf (2010) reminds 
readers of the initial three waves5 in deterrence research and 
suggests that the fourth wave finds its origin in the events of 9/11 
and focuses on the problem of asymmetric threats and great powers 
dealings with rogue or weak states and terrorists (including in the 
context of regional rivalries). Consequently, deterrence moved 
away from attempts to calculate and measure the number of 
weapons or a specific capability to deter against a particular threat 
at a particular time (Payne 2010). As opponents and contexts 
change, there has been renewed interest for ‘deterrence by 
denial’,6 which fits well with the idea that resilience and flexibility 
in society meets more appropriately today’s deterrence 
requirements. Knopf affirms that “bolstering societal resilience is 
especially important. When a society can demonstrate the ability to 
withstand terrorism, it sends a message that using this tactic will 
not enable terrorist organizations to achieve their goals.” (2010, p. 
12). 
In a sense, this is an acknowledgement that specified approaches 
(e.g. deterrence by retaliation or punishment) are deemed as being 
too narrow and require clear positioning as to what threat is 
acceptable and what is not. In contrast, ‘deterrence by denial’ 
allows a form of systemic thinking and denotes the need to redefine 
boundaries of the systems in focus (the deterred as well as the 
deterrent). Just as ‘deterrence by denial’ broadens the approaches 
to deterrence, so does the concept of ‘extended deterrence’. Such 
arrangements allow states to extend deterrence through formal and 
informal alliances – such as the EU and NATO. The extension of 
boundaries is problematic in that it flags up issues of credibility7 at 
the heart of a deterrent posture. 
3.
Correspondence Beyond Risk – 
Complementarity and Mismatch 
Risk tools have matured over centuries of mathematical discoveries 
and have offered humanity methodologies to understand their 
environment and to some extent how the past could inform the 
future (Bernstein 1996). However, in today’s reality of a globalised 
and highly interactive world, the effectiveness of strategies based 
on scenario planning is debated. Not surprisingly, both deterrence 
and resilience have evolved towards a broader scope to underpin 
their approaches. Accordingly, the conceptualisation of both 
deterrence and resilience is moving away from risk and its 
technocratic and formulaic risk management tools now perceived to 
be restrictive in their offer. 
3.1.
Areas of Complementarity
Building on the above, suggestion that the two concepts are, in fact, 
complementary is to be expected. 
For Juncos (2017), complementarity is fundamental: building 
resilience of the developing world is a way to increase the security 
of the developed world – hence reducing its need for deterrence. 
Gearson (2012) actually contends that resilience can be considered 
as an element of deterrence. For him, resilience strategies – through 
their effect on society, businesses and infrastructure – can be 
likened to the hardening of targets.8 Communication or messaging 
become particularly important in this respect; the challenge being 
to convey that resilience measures (here understood as the ability to 
cope with unexpected events) offer protection and long-term 
benefits to society by convincing would-be terrorists that their 
desired effect will not be achieved. Bendiek and Metzger (2015) 
also converge with that view and propose the term ‘deterrence-by-
resilience’. In the context of cyber security, Bendiek and Metzger 
argue that the new domain of cyber-defence is so fast evolving and 
complex and, consequently, there is a lack of clarity and impunity 
for attackers, which acts as a major block for the implementation of 
effective deterrence strategies.9
Again, in the cyber context, Bologna et al. (2013) suggest moving 
from a protective approach, referred to as “fortress”, where all 
acceptable precaution is taken, to one of “resilience” where 
protective, preventive, and deterrent safeguards are in place, but 
have limitations. In recognising that mitigation and protection 
measures are not always effective, Bologna et al. point to the 
importance of response, recovery, and restorative action in a 
resilience approach. This resigned admission is one deplored by 
Joseph when he criticises the UK National Security Strategy’s 
fatalistic claim that because risks are unpredictable, and cannot all 
be prevented, society at large should be involved in the process of 
risk management and responsible precautionary action. For him, 
although, “this sounds like a positive approach, but it actually 
encourages a rather passive attitude. It uses the idea of an external
threat to encourage individual adaptation. People are encouraged 
to engage actively with a wider situation that is deemed beyond 
their control. Hence the emphasis is on adapting to and exploiting 
a situation, rather than trying to change the wider social condition. 
Resilience, in contrast to something like resistance, implies the 
acceptance of a situation.” (Joseph 2013, p. 262). In a similar vein, 
Prior notes that in the context of NATO whilst “resilience is 
sometimes viewed almost as a panacea to anticipating uncertainty, 
reducing vulnerability and adapting to events – but it must be 
considered as a transformative process” (2017, p. 4). 
3.2.
Areas of Mismatch or Divergence – The Significance 
of Change and Transformation in Deterrence and 
Resilience Theories 
It is noticeable that the recent broadening of the deterrence and 
resilience concepts has meant that both concepts are now turning to 
adaptive and transformative outlooks. In the resilience domain, 
there are many debates on how far prevention, quick response and 
recovery constitute ‘measures’ of resilience when in fact capacity 
to adapt and transform are potentially better indicators systems 
resilience. Giroux and Prior talk of a continuum of the expression 
of resilience with ‘bouncing back’ at the ‘static’ end; where the 
systems’ functions are characterised by stability. At the other end 
of the continuum, where resilience is expressed through system 
dynamics and is demonstrated by the ability of system to change as 
a result of learning (2012; p. 11). 
With regards to deterrence theory, change and transformation is not 
so prominent conceptually, yet, Morgan notes “… with respect to 
actually using deterrence, much more interesting and innovative is 
how the western bloc is no longer status quo-oriented, fending off 
challenges to the established order. Instead, the West vigorously 
promotes democracy, open societies and economies, market 
systems and respect for human rights, in keeping with democratic 
peace theory and related liberal notions in which spreading those 
values and practices is the fundamental basis for a peaceful and 
secure international politics” (2012; p. 90). 
Makarenko (2008) points to two areas for the development of 
adaptive capacities relevant to deterrence. Makarenko’s primary 
focus is on the dynamic nature of the relationship between crime 
and terrorism and how the study of their interaction reveals 
networks that extends from an international to community 
contexts.10 She argues that the nature of terrorist and criminal 
organisations is adaptive and flexible; but that counter-measures 
nations adopt are not. Hence her suggestion is to adopt a more 
flexible approach context of anti-crime and counter-terrorism 
policies. In particular, Makarenko submits the idea that valuable 
intelligence and insight would be gained through the observation of 
crime patterns particularly with regards to financing.11 Perhaps, the 
proposition to introduce delays in an approach based on 
‘deterrence-by-punishment’ to allow an approach of ‘deterrence-
by-denial’ to emerge is believed to bring about adaptation and 
benefits in the long run. 
The study of resilience in the socio-ecological tradition provides 
interesting pointers in relation of adaptive and transformative 
capacity of systems. Davidson-Hunt and Berkes (2003) remind us 
of a typology of responses to surprises. The socio-ecological 
literature suggests that there are three types of surprises. The first 
type is described as ‘local’ and is generated by lack or narrow 
exposure (in time or space) by a particular system. Response 
strategies to these surprises involve broadening observation and 
information locally about the surprise (Gunderson 1999; Folke et 
al. 2007). Accumulation of knowledge is generally sufficient to 
allow risk-management-based strategies to deal with these surprises 
that are believed to have a statistical distribution. The second type 
of surprise, referred to as ‘cross-scales’, occurs in the context of 
interconnection amongst scales when “local variables coalesce to 
form a regional or global pattern, or when a process exhibits 
contagion” (Folke et al. 2007).12 Adaptations to this type of 
surprises require the coordinated effort of many stakeholders and 
although they may be common, they are controversial in that they 
require ad hoc policy measures if appropriate institutions are not 
available or are readily formed (Folke et al. 2007). The third type 
of surprises precludes predictions because of the genuine novelty 
the present. As such, the ‘never-seen-before’ phenomena 
experienced means that preparation, prevention or pre-adaptation is 
impossible (Berkes et al. 2003). Coping with this type of surprise 




This chapter has offered a review of deterrence and resilience, an 
undertaking which is topical – as both concepts have developed 
independently of each other, albeit in similar ways. On closer 
examination, it appears that both are cornerstones of security 
strategies – perhaps with their most significant difference being 
their referent object (deterrence being almost exclusively a matter 
for States). They both have risk at their heart and involve the 
management of risks and uncertainty. Consequently, their shared 
major shortcoming is the limitation of rationality upon which risk 
management is built. New patterns have seen increasing references 
to system thinking in both concepts (although for resilience, 
ecology and other natural sciences had adopted system theory from 
the outset – the principles have only permeated recently into the 
social science understanding of resilience). As a result, issues of 
system boundaries and system dynamics have influenced the 
evolution of current thinking. The conceptual approaches have 
broadened and are impacting upon current practice. It is clear that 
the concepts can be seen as complementary, in particular in the 
light of a globalised world with hybrid or asymmetric threats. 
Complementarity may be useful to policy makers, yet it is the 
notion of change that will bring about the biggest promises in the 
evolution of these concepts. How are the ideas of adaptation and 
transformation embraced in these concepts? There, the study of 
resilience may provide some interesting pointers for the future. 
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